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Here and Back Again:
US National Security Interest in the 
Arab/Israeli Conflict
Miriam Keim
Since its declaration of sovereignty in 1948, Israel has fought frequent wars 
with its Arab neighbors—the Six Day War, the War of Attrition, and the First 
and Second Lebanon Wars, just to name a few. Numerous peace treaties 
have been drafted, signed, and sometimes enforced. However, even with 
the concerted efforts of members of the international community including 
the United States and the United Nations, a final settlement establishing 
regional peace has not been attained. Disagreements range from Israel’s 
right to exist to the delineation of the borders for the proposed two states. 
Political leaders on both sides have agreed to, disagreed with, kept, and 
broken numerous promises and plans. 
 It would be easy to characterize the Arab/Israeli conflict as simply 
a religious disagreement: fiery rhetoric, often fueled by religious beliefs, is 
preached by both sides as to the legitimacy of the existence of Israel. Religion 
cannot be completely removed from the equation, as many contested 
sites, particularly in Jerusalem, have deep religious significance to Jews, 
Muslims, and Christians alike. However, the main motivator behind the 
conflict is land, with both Israelis and Palestinians claiming their rights to 
the area now known as Israel, as well as the disputed Occupied Territories, 
including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.1  
Any workable plan for establishing peace must take into account the 
disparities between the two populations which live in such close proximity, 
but have starkly different standards of living. Israel is a first world country 
with a functioning economy and a government acknowledged by most of the 
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world. The Palestinians are split into two groups, in Gaza and the West Bank, 
and there are many more still in refugee camps in neighboring countries. 
Both Gaza and the West Bank have semi-functioning governments, but 
they are unable to work together and much of the international community 
is opposed to working with Hamas in its current form. In 2006, pushed by 
the Bush Administration to hold democratic elections, Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip decided to throw out the corrupt Fatah Party and instead award 
control to Hamas, “the largest and most influential Palestinian militant 
movement.”2 Originating in the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization 
is responsible for terrorist activity throughout the West Bank and Gaza, 
including targeted killings of members of the defeated Fatah Party.
Economic growth cannot be overlooked in the peace process. 
Israel’s GDP is estimated at $206.9 billion, whereas the West Bank and 
Gaza’s GDP is closer to $12.79 billion.3  Encouraging news has recently 
been released by the World Bank concerning economic growth in both 
the West Bank and Gaza: “In the first half of 2010, the economy of WB&G 
continued to rebound and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects 
that real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth will reach eight percent 
in 2010.”4 Both areas still have considerable ground to cover before they 
can be competitive with Israel, but compared to where there were just ten 
years ago, at the beginning stages of the second intifada, the advance is 
significant. 
 In an ideal world, both Israeli and Palestinian leaders would 
like their respective citizens to have exclusive control over the land now 
occupied by Israel. It is possible that ardent Zionists and extreme members 
of various Palestinian parties, including Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), and Hezbollah, will never agree to anything other 
than complete control. Yet, since the United Nations Special Committee 
on Palestine (UNSCOP) first examined the issue, the policy of a “two-state 
solution” has been seen by many as the answer to the conflict. The United 
States has supported this position. President Obama, in his speech at Cairo 
University declared: “the only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides 
to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in 
peace and security.”5 George Mitchell, the US Special Envoy for Middle 
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East Peace, has echoed the President’s commitment to this solution in 
subsequent interviews.
US attemPtS at diPlomatic intervention in tHe conflict
In 1978, US President Jimmy Carter helped facilitate an Israeli-Egyptian 
peace treaty with the signing of the Camp David Accords. While the success 
of the Camp David Accords was important at the time, the world was of 
a different geopolitical power structure. The USSR was still a strong force; 
it would not enter Afghanistan and begin its slow decline in power for 
another year, and the dynamics of a bipolar world system were still locked 
in by the fierce battle between Washington and the Kremlin.  
 At the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the political 
atmosphere of the world had changed. The USSR was no more, and 
independent states were establishing themselves again in Eastern Europe. 
The United States had successfully rallied world support and secured the 
Security Council’s blessing for President George H.W. Bush’s decision to 
invade Iraq and push Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.  Ready to tackle 
peace in the Middle East, an invitation to Israeli and Palestinian leaders 
was extended:
After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and 
the Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union 
believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the 
prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The 
United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the 
parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, 
between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and 
the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real 
peace. (Emphasis added)6 
With this notice, the first post-Cold War peace attempts were launched. 
Negations stalled and President Bush was replaced by President Bill Clinton, 
but eventually both the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed to sit down and 
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talk in January 1993. Nine months later, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and 
Yasser Arafat signed the historic Oslo Accords on the White House lawn. 
With this, Israel recognized Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization as 
the representative of the Palestinian people and signalled its willingness 
to negotiate with them. Arafat in turn “acknowledged Israel’s right for a 
safe and peaceful existence.”7  The PLO was now in charge of selecting an 
interim government for a Palestinian state. Finally, almost 60 years after 
the UN’s original two state plan, peace was near.
 Despite efforts from the Clinton Administration, this plan too was 
fated for more conflict:
The Clinton team focused intensely, even obsessively on 
keeping the Israeli-Palestinian tack alive and maintaining 
momentum in the talks, but at the expense of debilitating 
actions by the parties—Palestinian violence and incitement, 
Israeli Settlement expansion, Palestinian Authority (PA) 
corruption and constant backsliding by both sides—that 
ultimately overwhelmed and defeated the process.8 
While President Clinton continued pursuing peace, several other meetings 
were arranged and publicized over his presidency, and the situation 
in Israel continued to deteriorate. With the Al-Aqsa, or Second Intifada, 
starting in late 2000, the final months of President Clinton’s presidency 
were marred by the reports of violence throughout the region.
 The environment that greeted President George W. Bush had 
deteriorated drastically since the signing of the Oslo Accords. Additionally, 
some felt that “the Bush 43 approach to the conflict lack both commitment 
and a sense of strategic purpose.”9 The administration was not pulled 
towards Jerusalem, but instead set their sights further east, to Iraq and 
Saddam Hussein. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President 
Bush chose to focus first on Afghanistan, and then Iraq. In the midst of the 
Second Intifada, American interest at the top level was pulled away from 
Israel and towards a different target. Like his successor, though, Bush was 
not able to stay away from the conflict long and in 2003, “The Quartet”—
the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations—
released a “Roadmap for Peace.”  Announced soon after US troops 
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overthrew Saddam in Iraq, the plan set forth “an ambitious three-stage, 
performance based plan to stabilize Israeli/Palestinian relations, bolster 
Palestinian institutions, and move the parties back to negotiations over a 
two-state settlement.”10 Now, while engaged in building a democracy in 
Iraq, the United States would also be encouraging the same activity with 
the Palestinians. 
 This plan lead up to the 2006 elections in the West Bank and Gaza 
through which Hamas won control of the Gaza Strip. Their conclusion 
unforeseen, the elections highlighted the dangers of democratic societies: 
sometimes the voting population wants someone who is an unimaginable 
or undesirable choice in the perspective of outside powers. Fatah, although 
corrupt and an unsavory ally for the United States, was a known quantity. 
Not only was Hamas a new system to learn, but its penchant for terrorist 
acts caused diplomatic headaches for the United States. Because US laws 
against financing terrorism prevented giving money to the government in 
charge, the Roadmap to Peace now had a new obstacle to surmount in order 
to build Palestinian civil society with the hopes of a two state solution.
 Another change to the peace process came with the November 2004 
death of Yasser Arafat, long time leader of the PLO, cosigner of the Oslo 
Accord, and a revered figure throughout the Palestinian population. He 
was mourned throughout the Arab world, but Israelis greeted his death as 
an event that might lead towards an eventual peace. However, just a little 
over a year after Arafat’s death, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered 
a major stroke from which he never recovered. With new leadership for 
both sides in place, the Roadmap was approached again, but as of yet few 
significant gains have been made. This is due in large part to the lack of a 
valid leader for all Palestinians, creating a situation in which there is no 
one head to negotiate with. 
 President Barack Obama ushered in a new age of diplomacy with 
his inauguration in 2009. Recently, direct talks have been attempted, but 
little has come from them. In the short time that he has been in office, 
Obama has faced many of the same roadblocks that stood in the way of his 
predecessors. The building of Israeli settlements continues to stir tensions 
in Jerusalem and the West Bank, while rockets from Gaza are fired more 
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often than Israelis are comfortable with. Issues that have been discussed 
since the first attempts at a peace and a two state solution are still present 
today. Where should the borders be drawn? Will right of return be enforced? 
How does an independent state of Palestine exist, when it is split in half by 
its neighbor? And the more modern question, how can a Palestinian state 
that is internally divided be united? 
US Strategic intereStS in tHe conflict
The United States has financially and diplomatically supported Israel 
since its inception, but it also has a strong interest in the Arab community. 
The instability that the Israeli/Palestine conflict contributes to the region 
greatly hinders positive development and seriously threatens peace efforts. 
This instability is a particular concern for US national security, as some of 
the grievances expressed by terrorist organizations in the Muslim world 
stem from America’s involvement and support of Israel.11 
 Perhaps the most pressing issue currently is the Iranian regime’s 
attempts to secure nuclear technology. Despite assurances from Iran that 
the nuclear technology it is developing will be for energy purposes only, 
many in the international community remain unconvinced that their true 
aim is not to secure nuclear weapons. The recent Wikileaks scandal has 
shown that this fear is held not only by Western countries, but also by 
Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia.12 No county is more worried about 
the threat of a nuclear Iran than Israel. Faced with overwhelming threats 
from other Arab countries in the past, Israel has won militarily. A nuclear 
attack would be different and much harder to defend against. The existence 
of the program, coupled with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 
calls for the destruction of Israel, has led to ever-increasing tension in the 
region. While the US and other international powers have worked to halt 
Iran’s nuclear developments, Iran’s willingness to capitalize on this tension 
only increases instability. 
 President Obama has promised to drawdown troops from both Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the coming years. On August 31, 2010 the last official 
US combat troops left Iraq, although over 50,000 “non-combat” troops 
are still on the ground.13 These troops are supposed to be redeployed by 
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2011, although the date of their final departure may depend on the ability 
of Iraqi forces. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the Obama administration has 
begun training local security forces to take over combat duties, with the 
hopes of redeploying American troops from the country by 2014.14 Even 
with troop withdrawals, the threat of terrorism remains high in the region, 
with increased activity being seen in Yemen and Pakistan. 
If the United States was successful in helping bring a resolution 
to the Arab/Israeli conflict, Middle Eastern aggression against the United 
States might lessen. In past peace attempts, the Arab League was heavily 
invested in any action on the Palestinians’ part and would undoubtedly be 
involved in approving and implementing any two-state plan that would 
lead to peace. If sincere, the Arab League’s commitment to peace between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians would represent an ideological shift in 
most of its members’ thoughts towards the existence of Israel. If granted 
assurance that their right to exist was acknowledged by the Arab League 
members, Israel could feel more secure. Palestinians, backed by fellow 
Muslim states and much of the West, could begin to build their own state. 
Stability between the Israelis and Palestinians, and acceptance by Arab 
states of the existence of Israel would allow the United States to focus more 
of its attentions in other areas of the Middle East, and would potentially 
increase the effectiveness of its foreign policy in the region. 
american USe of military and Hard Power
The US military is the strongest fighting force in the world, providing 
troops not only for its own missions, but also to supplement the forces 
of multilateral organizations, such as NATO and the United Nations. 
In Afghanistan, even with coalition forces in place, American troops 
outnumber those from any other single country.15 With military superiority 
over every other country, the United States could in theory use this power 
to solve conflicts around the world. Korea, Vietnam, and Bosnia are three 
examples of the use of “hard power” with varying degrees of success and 
failures. 
 Despite the United States’ ability to use military power, it is difficult 
to find many calls for such power to be used in the Arab/Israeli debate. 
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Hard power has not been seen as a serious option for US responses to 
various Israeli actions, ranging from expanding settlements to blockading 
Gaza to full scale invasions. Besides the difficulties of fighting troops 
armed with one’s own technology and well trained at using it, the domestic 
backlash that a US president would face for ordering such an attack could 
be catastrophic to any future political goals.  
Former Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arens, 
in an interview dated April 3, 2010, proclaimed that “the Obama 
administration’s leverage is beginning to sound like ‘hard power’—
brutal even—to get Israel to toe the line.”16 He referred to the Obama 
administrations’ objection to new settlements being built in Jerusalem, 
a development that was announced while Vice President Joe Biden was 
visiting the country. A month later, WorldNetDaily announced that “a US 
plan envisions stationing international troops along Israel’s border with a 
future Palestinian state….”17 However, the details of this plan are far from 
brutal, as it envisions international peace keepers watching the borders, 
similar to UN forces in the Sinai on the border between Egypt and Gaza, 
and on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon.  Far from the combat troops 
we see pictures of in Iraq or Afghanistan, these troops would resemble the 
lightly armed, if armed at all, blue helmets we so often see in Africa. 
american USe of Soft Power and PUBlic diPlomacy
Regardless of the exact reason, the United States has traditionally not 
engaged in “hard power” with regards to the Arab/Israeli conflict. 
Consequently an examination of its policy becomes a search for the use of 
“soft power” instead. Soft power, or the ability of a “country to get what 
it wants by attraction rather than through coercion,” is a concept first set 
forward by Joseph Nye in order to explain why the United States was as 
successful in its diplomacy as it came to be.18 In Nye’s words “this attractive, 
or ‘soft’ power, stemmed from American culture, values, and policies that 
were broadly inclusive and seen as legitimate in the eyes of others.”19 In 
others words, the United States relies on other people wanting to be like 
Americans, or at least accepting their way of life. 
 To this end, American government agencies, especially the State 
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Department, rely heavily on the tools of soft power: “public diplomacy, 
broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, 
military-to-military contacts.”20 Public diplomacy, a term that has been 
used frequently relative to the WikiLeaks release, “refers to government-
sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other 
countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural 
exchanges, radio and television.”21 While one might wonder if public 
diplomacy sometimes crosses into the realm of propaganda, the concept 
allows for a break from traditional diplomacy. Instead of interacting solely 
on the official diplomatic level, the United States uses public diplomacy 
to reach the citizens of the country it is trying to influence directly, by 
“winning the hearts and the minds” of the people. 
 But how does a nation apply public diplomacy or soft power in a 
country that is already so similar to itself? Israel is a democracy, and its 
people enjoy many of the same freedoms held by inhabitants of the United 
States. The attractiveness of American culture to a Pole at the end of the 
Cold War, is bound to have been considerably higher than it is for a man 
walking down the street in Tel Aviv today. The use of soft power with the 
Palestinians is problematic as well, because the United States is seen as 
pro-Israel within the Arab world. Indeed, President Obama in his speech 
in Cairo stated:
America’s strong bonds with Israel are well known.  
This bond is unbreakable.  It is based upon cultural and 
historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration for a 
Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be 
denied.22 
Despite this, American authority has often been inserted as a mediator in 
the conflict, particularly in the unipolar world that followed the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The issue facing American diplomats in the Arab/Israeli 
conflict is not one of trying to win the Palestinians over, convincing them of 
the benefits of the United States. In the same speech, President Obama also 
laid out an American understanding of the Palestinian struggle: 
On the other hand, it is also undeniable that the Palestinian 
PePPerdine Policy review— SPring 2011
 
 108
people — Muslims and Christians — have suffered in pursuit 
of a homeland. For more than 60 years they’ve endured the 
pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West 
Bank, Gaza, and neighboring lands for a life of peace and 
security that they have never been able to lead. They endure 
the daily humiliations — large and small — that come with 
occupation. So let there be no doubt: The situation for the 
Palestinian people is intolerable. And America will not 
turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for 
dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.23 
Indeed, one of the biggest hurdles to overcome is not feelings towards 
Americans, but instead to Israelis, still seen as the occupiers who have 
stolen Palestinian lands. US national security interests in the region may 
desire peace in order to obtain stability, but how does an outside power 
contribute to changing the feelings of citizens in internal struggle who are 
not necessarily opposed to the outside force?   
 The answer to both of the above dilemmas seems to be coercive 
power. This author would argue that American policy has adopted neither 
a solely hard or soft power position, especially in its dealings with Israel. 
Elements of both exist. Soft power efforts are used within the West Bank and 
Gaza. The Israeli diplomatic visits to the United States before the 1967 war, 
to gauge whether they would receive US support or military opposition if 
need be, show the importance of American military power in the region. 
While the United States may not send its own troops into battle in Gaza to 
fight Hamas rockets, it does not necessarily spring into action to halt Israeli 
military campaigns, tacitly allowing damage to be done by Israeli forces in 
retribution for attacks against their country. One could argue that this lack 
of action is in itself the exercise of a type of hard power. 
 One form of power does speak to both the Israeli and the 
Palestinian/Arab worlds. “For policymakers, foreign assistance plays a key 
role in advancing US foreign policy goals in the Middle East.”24 Monetary 
assistance has tremendous effects on American power in the region. 
This funding, given in various forms to both the Israeli and Palestinian 
governments, falls somewhere in between the use of hard and soft power; 
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a coercive power, if we may.
 For the Israelis, American financial assistance has been crucial to its 
existence. According to the Congressional Research Service: 
Since 1976, Israel has been the largest annual recipient of 
US foreign assistance and is the largest cumulative recipient 
since World War II. Strong congressional support for Israel 
has resulted in Israel’s receiving benefits that may not be 
available to other countries. For example, Israel can use 
US military assistance for research and development in 
the United States and for military purchases in Israel. In 
addition, all US foreign assistance earmarked for Israel is 
delivered in the first 30 days of the fiscal year. Other recipients 
normally receive their aid in staggered installments at 
varying times. According to the Obama Administration’s 
2011 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) for Foreign 
Operations, “US assistance is also aimed at ensuring for 
Israel the security it requires to make concessions necessary 
for comprehensive regional peace.”25
US military assistance to Israel is especially important to note. Before the 
1967 war, France was the primary supplier of Israel’s military supplies, 
but due to pressure from the Arab community, Charles de Gaulle ended 
his country’s assistance.  This void was filled by the United States, which, 
since President Eisenhower, had been committed to ensuring Israel’s safety. 
During the Cold War, Israeli pilots flew Western planes against the Soviet-
made MiGs provided to their Arab enemy. Just as the United States was 
committed to Israel’s military preponderance then, it remains committed to 
a militarily strong Israel that maintains “its qualitative military advantage 
[which] enhances security by preventing regional conflict and builds the 
confidence necessary for Israel to take calculated risks for peace.”26
 The United States also provides funding for Palestinian authorities, 
but in a much smaller amounts and with a much more restricted distribution. 
From the report cited above: 
Since the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, US 
PePPerdine Policy review— SPring 2011
 
 110
assistance to the Palestinians has averaged about $388 
million a year. During the 1990s, US foreign aid to the 
Palestinians averaged approximately $75 million per year. 
Most US assistance to the Palestinians is provided through 
USAID’s West Bank and Gaza program. USAID allocates 
funds for projects in sectors such as humanitarian assistance, 
economic development, democratic reform, improving 
water access and other infrastructure, health care, education, 
and vocational training (currently most, if not all, funds for 
the Gaza Strip are dedicated to humanitarian assistance 
and economic recovery needs). By law, US assistance 
to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as for all other 
aid recipients, must be vetted and audited to ensure that 
no US funds are provided to or through any individual, 
private or government entity, or educational institution that 
advocates, plans, sponsors, engages in, or has engaged in, 
terrorist activity.27
While funding for the Palestinians has increased significantly, it still reaches 
nowhere near the more than $3 billion granted to Israel on a yearly basis. 
Additionally, unlike Israel, Palestinians do not receive military aid or the 
generous allowances for research and development of military technology. 
Instead, they received funds for humanitarian assistance, economic 
development, and other infrastructure issues. Highlighted in the passage 
above is another problem faced by American diplomats and policy makers: 
the presence of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
 In 2006, prompted by the Bush Administration to hold the elections, 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip decided to no longer be governed by the 
corrupt Fatah Party, and instead awarded control to Hamas, the “the largest 
and most influential Palestinian militant movement”28 Because it is labeled 
a “foreign terrorist organization” by the US State Department, no American 
funds can be delivered to the Hamas-run government in Gaza.29 Since the 
majority of the funding comes through USAID, a government organization 
often associated with soft power, US assistance to the West Bank and Gaza 
looks much more like aid given to other developing countries around the 
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world. And, as with other developing countries, Palestinians receive aid 
from sources other than the United States: 
The EU is currently the largest multinational donor to the 
Palestinian Authority. On 19 January the Palestinian Prime 
Minister and a representative of the Commission signed 
an agreement to pay EUR 158.5 million in support of the 
Palestinian Authority’s recurrent expenditure for 2010.30
The presence of this foreign money raises an important question for 
American foreign policy. If stability in the Arab/Israeli conflict is an 
important goal for the United States, is it wise to allow greater assistance 
to be given by another government? While one might hope that the 
European Union has goals similar to the United States for its security, is the 
American position weakened because the Palestinian community receives 
significantly less US aid money than is granted to Israel? With the United 
States still spearheading peace efforts, it seems unlikely that the EU has 
usurped American importance in the eyes of the Palestinians, but seeds 
have been sown. 
conclUSion
In an age in which Russia and China are both amassing power and 
resources and are relatively unlikely to worry about the side activities 
of governments that they partner with, the United States runs the threat 
of being replaced in its importance if it is unable to increase its standing 
within the Arab world. While America has acted as an important mediator 
of the conflict in the past, the rise of other powers allows the possibility 
that the United States will no longer be the driving force behind future 
peace accords. This is a dangerous situation for the United States; it must 
use its resources to combat that possibility. 
As US national security strategy advances, “in the present strategic 
environment, defined most notably by the threat from al Qaeda, the 
broader struggle against Islamist militancy and the ongoing challenges 
of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Arab/Israeli peacemaking has become 
even more important.”31 With troop drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
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Iranian nuclear threats, radical Islam continuing its spread throughout the 
Middle East, and the United States’ ever present need for energy, stability 
will be at a high premium. While there is no unitary solution to the ills of 
the Middle East—the region is far too diverse for that to be possible—the 
United States must prioritize what conflicts it wants to have an impact on, 
with some consideration to what conflicts it can have an impact in. 
 The Israeli/Palestinian debate will not disappear. It will not 
dwindle down or become able to be pushed away when inconvenient. 
Instead, the Arab/Israeli conflict is of strategic interest to the United States, 
and America’s close relationship with Israel ensures that this will remain 
the case. To preserve the credibility of the United States in the Arab world, 
and to manage the conflict, the United States will have to decide how to 
employ its hard and soft powers in more effective manners
If the Arab/Israeli question is of strategic interest to the United 
States, how then should it proceed in shaping the conflict and any resolution 
towards peace? Above all the United States must determine what level of 
resolution it will be able to achieve that will allow for stability. With years 
of grievances suffered by both sides, it may be generations before any 
meaningful conflict transformation occurs, before Israelis and Palestinians 
accept each other and allow for open democracies to exist side by side. For 
the immediate future, the goal of conflict management is more attainable.
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